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Gordon Downie & Ian Pace - a 
dialogue  
Composer Gordon Downie and 
pianist Ian Pace discuss music, 
visual art, culture, modernism, 
Marxism and Britain 
Gordon Downie is a unique figure in British new music, or 
indeed anywhere, with whom I have had the pleasure to work on 
multiple occasions. His music (and visual art) demonstrates a 
ferocious commitment to the possibilities of complex abstraction 
and a pronounced resistance towards passive, habitual listening. 
This extended and in-depth interview has been conducted over 
several months by e-mail, and delves deep into issues of 
complexity, modernism, the role of culture in late capitalist 
society, and the current state of new music. The type of language 
used, drawing extensively upon ideas and methodologies from 
Marxism and the Frankfurt School as well as elevated levels of 
technical musical discourse, may seem difficult and a little 
esoteric to some, but has both a beauty and an objectivity of its 
own. Discourse about music and cultural matters in Britain in 
particular is notoriously woolly, over-laden with tired 
metaphorical clichés and rather quaint biographical reductionism. 
Through this dialogue, Gordon Downie and I attempt to offer an 
alternative discursive possibility, in part as a strategy to find a 
way beyond the prison-house that more conventional writing on 
music frequently imposes, laden as it is with so many aesthetic 
and societal assumptions that are tacitly accepted and never 
questioned. Our positions and convictions on many issues are by 
no means identical, as should become clear through reading, but 
the interaction was deeply fruitful and stimulating. 
For myself, having known and conversed with Gordon Downie for 
quite a number of years now, I have so often found our dialogues 
force me to rethink various slightly banal assumptions I might 
have previously made, and sharpened up my thinking on many 
matters, though I choose to maintain my own positions often (for 
example on jazz!). 
This interview deserves to be read carefully and diligently, and all 
those involved in the world of contemporary music or culture in 
general should ask themselves if they can really afford not to 
engage with the issues raised. I hope that in the context of 
British music, this discourse represents a beginning rather than 
an end. 
Ian Pace, October 2004 
1. 
Ian Pace : Gordon, you seem as committed an advocate of the 
ideals of 'high' modernism in music (as well as in architecture and 
other artistic media) as just about any composer I have 
encountered. Can you tell me about how you first became drawn 
towards a modernist aesthetic, and how your interests 
developed? 
Gordon Downie : And with my university duties you should add 
to that list computer science, which, in its emphasis on the 
systematic organisation and analysis of problems and 
phenomena, offers us a scientific-technical model for creative 
action fully in keeping with aesthetic modernism. But that kind of 
breadth and interdisciplinarity is essential for me, otherwise one 
is subject to making all those operational and conceptual 
mistakes that are borne of an extreme division of labour. It's a 
result of a desire to think structurally, to comprehend the 
intricate connectivity between phenomena. Modernist architects, 
composers, and visual artists have (or had) the same, or closely 
similar concerns, and it's essential to see how those concerns 
manifest themselves in different media. 
But aesthetic modernism, of course, is just a field-specific 
manifestation of a wider socio-political programme of 
modernisation and cultural maturation. That's what gives the 
programme legitimacy for me, in that it penetrates well beyond 
merely parochial, aesthetic concerns. We should note, for 
example, that constructionism emanated from a socio-political 
context of liberation, that many of the most important manifestos 
of this period from Abstract-Creation, Unism, and De Stijl, though 
articulated in an aesthetic form, are essentially political 
statements, and political statements of the radical left: who 
would deny the essential connectivity between Mondrian's notion 
of equivalance and socialist distributions of power? One of the 
problems now is that the new left and its various offshoots (and 
I'm not referring here to party affiliation), has taken the 
dictatorship of the proletariat so literally. It's true that high 
cultural forms remain inaccessible to both the proletariat and 
large sections of the petit bourgeoisie. For those writers of the 
New Left Review, and Culture, Theory and Critique, the solution is 
to interpret aesthetic complexity as a means to sustain an 
unequal distribution of cultural power. By this route all high-
cultural endeavour is condemned. But such an analysis, 
intentionally or not, conspires with those very forms of 
domination with which the new left has claimed to be at war. 
Whilst our systems of education and media dissemination 
continue not to serve the interests of genuine intellectual 
enlightenment and engagement, broad masses of the population 
will continue to find the most radical and revolutionary cultural 
artefacts utterly impenetrable. So if they prefer Big Brother or 
Eastenders to Stockhausen's Gruppen or Joyce's Ulysses , and if 
they prefer B&Q pseudo-Georgian to Le Corbusier functional, we 
should analyse what role Big Brother, Eastenders, and B&Q 
pseudo-Georgian have in maintaining the proletariat in this state 
of anaesthetised ignorance. The new lefts' time would be better 
spent analysing and attacking this: as it is currently constituted, 
the proletariat is a product of capital, and as such, should, like 
capital, be condemned. 
So I could respond to your question by citing my first encounter 
of Webern's Symphony Opus 21 or 
Stockhausen's Klavierstücke I as life-changing events, but I'd 
rather refrain from such bourgeois autobiography and self-
aggrandisement if you don't mind. What we might query is how, 
in our present cultural climate, one can sustain, let alone initiate, 
a commitment to ideals such as these. Given Boulez's trajectory, 
it's not as if one has models to follow. On the contrary, this 
composer's appropriation and privatisation of this tendency is as 
much a factor in Modernism's decline as a dominant paradigm, as 
are the attacks from more obviously reactionary sources, such as 
those representatives of the so-called post-modern and other 
cultural neo-conservatives. 
IP : Point taken about bourgeois autobiography! It's a quaint and 
trite bourgeois notion that all art is about nothing more than the 
personality quirks of its creator - a convenient ideological tool for 
neutralising its wider relevance. Anyhow, your reply suggests to 
me a number of questions and issues to discuss, which I'd like to 
outline at length. 
While in total agreement with you about the link between 
modernist artistic manifestos and radical movements for political 
change, it might be argued by some that such tendencies are 
over-utopian in nature, disengaged from the historical state of 
underdeveloped class consciousness at the time of their 
emergence (and today). 
GD : How can one be over- utopian?! The conditions that gave 
rise to the movements and ideals that I cite have only changed in 
their severity and totality, which only make those ideals even 
more important. 
IP: Well, this leads me to several suppositions. I would imagine 
you would agree that ruling class ideology has a vested interest 
in maintaining a high degree of disengagement on the part of the 
working classes, so that, as you say, their attentions are 
concentrated upon Big Brother and EastEnders (and celebrity 
trivia) rather than more exalted and potentially emancipatory 
artistic creations less easily assimilated into the entertainment 
industry, not to mention greater awareness of the limitations 
provided by their class position, or the realities of Western 
imperial domination. Given such an actually existing situation, is 
it not possible that 'high' art (in this case specifically high 
modernist art) lends itself too easily to appropriation for the 
purposes of bourgeois hegemony? 
To give a less jargon-ridden example of that, the purported 
'difficulty' of highly complex music can lead to the cultivation of 
the 'specialist listener', he/she who prides themselves on their 
superior understanding as opposed to that of the masses he/she 
looks down upon with patronising contempt. I've seen this sort of 
appropriation implicit in the attitudes towards such music from 
many in the musical world (especially those from backgrounds of 
privilege and the public schools); as such, do we not need to 
address the danger of such arts being used as a weapon for 
maintaining a state of class divisiveness? The proletariat are 
indeed a historical product of capitalism, but so are the 
bourgeoisie - Marx would see both disappearing after socialist 
revolution. What would you propose as workable methodologies 
for examining the state of proletariat consciousness that leads 
them to prefer popular art forms to high modernism? Shouldn't 
bourgeois consciousness and artistic preferences also be subject 
to an equal degree of critical scrutiny? 
GD : Your observations point to the contradictions inherent in 
capitalist, class societies. The contradiction here is that high-
culture is indeed appropriated by the bourgeoisie to sustain 
unequal distributions of power. But the bourgeoisie appropriate 
everything. It doesn't mean that such work is produced 
specifically for them, it means that only they , in principle, have 
the intellectual capacity (itself a product of privileged educational 
opportunity), to comprehend and patronise it, in addition to the 
necessary leisure time. Though of course, we should be a little 
clearer about what we mean by the term bourgeoisie . They do 
have the educational foundation, potentially, but only a minority 
engage in the kind of intellectual challenges that we are 
identifying. The extreme divisions of labour we witness in 
capitalist society place severe constraints on the ability of 
different sections of that society to comprehend the activities of 
another. And for the most part, bourgeois or proletarian, most 
subjects reject complex art. This may indicate that progressive 
cultural production, like any other sphere of high-level human 
activity, is something for which significant preparation and 
education is required, and although class origin and interests play 
a part in the willingness and ability of subjects to engage it, 
other, culture-specific issues also come into play. For the most 
part, it would seem that art is seen to fulfil certain emotional 
expectations. If it doesn't, then it is rejected. This has been the 
fate of the high-modernist avant-garde, an indication, perhaps, of 
its genuinely negatory character, and thus its importance in the 
wider socio-political context. 
But I produce work for no particular class faction. However, I do 
require from listeners certain educational and intellectual pre-
requisites to enable the work to be understood. Why is this so 
surprising? This is my expectation. If one wishes to explore 
complex cognitive phenomena in art, one will obviously require 
from one's clientele a willingness and an ability, in addition to the 
patience, to penetrate it at the appropriate level. I believe that an 
interest in exploring complexity, the thread connecting all the 
advanced art of our time, is quite appropriate and 
understandable. Unfortunately, those with the necessary 
qualifications are largely drawn from bourgeois class factions. I 
would rather this wasn't the case. But I am not prepared to 
change my creative focus to ameliorate the problem. This is 
simple-minded. To start to compose workers' marches or use 
common tonal triads reduces both the analysis and the solution to 
this problem to a level of extreme banality. This serves no 
interests other than those of power: by jettisoning complexity, we 
disassemble one of the remaining weapons against the process of 
intellectual emaciation, conformity and passivity that 
characterises capitalist societies. 
Of course, it will be argued that high art is itself a creation or 
product of bourgeois consciousness, which serves bourgeois class 
interests. In other words, artists are themselves recruited from 
the ranks of the bourgeoisie or internalise bourgeois ideology. It 
is for this reason that we need to examine the medium itself. All 
objective phenomena are complex, natural or synthetic. It should 
come as no surprise to us that products of artifice, of which 
cultural products are an example, should also exhibit complexity. 
Generally, simplicity isn't interesting. This suspicion of collusion 
held by factions of the new left serves the interests of only one 
class faction: power. 
IP : But do you see any value at all in inhabiting artistic forms 
and genres perceived as more 'accessible', to subvert and 
defamiliarise them from within to engender critical consciousness 
of both the forms/genres themselves and also of the wider social 
and historical processes that gave birth to them in the first place? 
An obvious example of this is in the plays of Brecht; some of the 
music of Mauricio Kagel, Dieter Schnebel, Nicolaus A. Huber and 
Konrad Boehmer attempts a similar process, so by very different 
means does the early work of Frank Zappa. 
GD: Given the immediacy of the theatre, a case might be 
convincingly advanced for Brecht, but what evidence is there that 
those methods of subversion practiced by Huber and Schnebel, 
for example, actually reach their target? And they must have a 
target otherwise their position is untenable. Might it not be the 
case that, once again, it is only the bourgeoisie that is able to de-
code such intentions, which rely upon a considerable level of 
formal education which the proletarian is unlikely to have 
acquired? That being the case, the main achievement here is the 
compromising of high-art endeavour. Following Adorno, I would 
be inclined to view committed art or critical composition as a form 
of pseudo-activity. Those artists who place the medium at the 
service of political agitation or subversion might have a greater 
chance of effecting real social change if their energies were 
applied to real, direct political action. I am unable to argue that 
complexity doesn't assist the maintenance of the political status 
quo. But capital deforms and corrupts all that it touches. 
Resisting this process of deformation strikes me as the most 
effective response, and this can only be attempted by maintaining 
the autonomy of artistic media. By placing the medium at the 
service of political agitation, committed art deforms the medium. 
Clearly, the bourgeois and the proletarian are both products of 
capital. But I would argue that only the intellectual, who is ideally 
outside either class formation, has any chance of transcending 
these conditions. We are all in the fish tank together, but we can 
become more aware of the ideological waters through which we 
travel. In advocating the primacy of the medium and artistic 
autonomy, I am well aware that I present myself open to charges 
of conspiring, indirectly, with power. But this is a contradiction 
internal to the system. Of course, appropriation is one thing, but 
the intellectual can collude with power directly by manufacturing 
his or her art with a view to maximise its success or symbolic 
profit margin in market society. And since the last aggressive re-
assertion of capital in the form of Thatcherite and Reaganite 
economics, this has become the norm for several generations of 
neo-conservative British composers and visual artists. I would 
argue that the vast bulk of new music composed in the UK today 
is an act of simulation, simulation in the sense that the fake is 
now the preferred model. 
IP: The artistic movements you listed earlier, and others from the 
same time, sprang up as a response to particular historical 
circumstances. Are they utterly predicated upon the particularities 
of the historical moments from which they emanated, and if so, 
do you think our current historical moment is sufficiently similar 
so that such movements are not diminished in their importance 
and vitality? 
GD : As I stated earlier, the conditions that gave rise to such 
movements haven't changed, so the relevance of such ideas and 
programmes has not diminished. There are plenty of voices that 
would like to pretend that such conditions have changed, to 
enable them to brand mere reformist opportunism as radical. This 
is a strategy that typifies the agendas of both cultural producers 
and administrators, and political parties, New Labour being prime 
among them. It is an attempt to erase memories, and they are 
doing an excellent job of it. 
IP : What you locate as the new left (with respect to an over-
literalist view of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the sense of 
wishing to impose the currently-existing state of proletarian 
consciousness and taste upon all people) seems to me a better 
description of the Stalinist and Maoist left. Cornelius Cardew's 
rejection of all his and others' modernist and experimental work 
in favour of a 'music for the people' is the epitome of this 
ideological viewpoint. There are many on the 'new' left (including 
myself) who believe that increased education and accessibility 
can act as a means to enhance the possibility of working class 
people being able to engage with supposedly more 'demanding' 
art (and politics!) - even a plain social democrat would surely be 
sympathetic in this respect. After all, there is no more demeaning 
attitude one can take towards working class people than to deny 
their potential (on the question of whether Cardew was guilty of 
this I remain agnostic). Actual organisations and programmes 
such as the Open University, or Workers Educational 
Programmes, were designed in part as a response to these needs 
in more social democratic times. Do you feel in sympathy with 
such a view? 
GD : Of course, any mechanism that can help the proletariat in 
this way is welcome, but such efforts are, of course, largely 
reformist, and for that reason, as Rosa Luxemburg showed us, 
they do not represent real solutions. Rather, such solutions are 
equivalent to putting a plaster on a gunshot wound - they come 
too late. 
IP : With reference to your comment about an intellectual 
manufacturing his or her art for purposes of maximising success 
in market society - how precisely do you think a composer does 
this? And how is it possible to act differently? 
GD : We're already accustomed, of course, to market priorities 
determining at a fundamental level the way that arts and cultural 
organisations operate. The withdrawal of state subsidy during the 
past twenty years or more has made such organisations 
increasingly dependent upon corporate largesse. But this largesse 
comes at a price. For corporations, association with cultural 
organisations has symbolic value, to enhance the corporation's 
image in society. Their finance, in consequence, will only be 
awarded to those organisations, events, or cultural producers that 
maximise that image and that symbolic profit. But this means 
that those values associated with the market risk penetrating 
cultural organisations and influencing their decision-making. In 
such circumstances, organisations are either pressurised to 
withdraw support from any cultural product of a negatory 
complexion, or use this market-driven climate as a cloak to mask 
a cultural agenda that is already reactionary. Given this 
environment, we should ask ourselves whether cultural products 
themselves have escaped this process of commodification, or 
whether creative horizons and ambitions are similarly determined 
and constrained by the priorities of the market. In other words, 
are creative artists creating with market success in mind, 
however diffuse the definition of market might be in this context? 
Once again, this is an environment which creative artists of a 
reactionary or neo-conservative tendency find hospitable to their 
creative inclinations. In such circumstances, their otherwise 
reactionary behaviour can be interpreted and marketed as a 
healthy realism, which exhibits a flexible, pragmatic response to 
new, social realities over which they have no control. And as the 
market penetrates state educational provision and the university 
sector, this process finds formal legitimation. This is a cultural 
environment that becomes a highly hospitable breeding ground 
for the restoration of cultural-historical resources 
that objective historical processes have already superseded. 
But this isn't an argument about material. We risk missing the 
point if we make this an argument about the continued relevance 
or not of either tonality or the formal archetypes to which it is 
umbilically connected. For composers who employ these means, 
in whatever degraded and distorted form they usually take and 
however well masked they may be with occasional splashes of 
modernity, their use is primarily symbolic, in order to signal to 
their consumers (whether listeners or performers) or their 
employers (whether performers, promoters, publishers, or 
broadcasters), their intention to conform to certain ideological 
norms, and their intention to affirm and reproduce within the 
cultural sector and within an aesthetic context, their submission 
to commodity form. But of course, we must bare in mind that 
Judith Weir, James MacMillan, Thomas Adès, John Woolrich, John 
Casken, or Sally Beamish (to take the most obvious examples of 
this neo-conservative tendency), don't really compose tonally. 
Their product is eclectic in the truest sense of the term, in that 
survival in market society is dependent upon exhibiting maximum 
flexibility, in order, like the true entrepreneur or spiv, to take 
advantage of opportunities when and if they arise. So to answer 
your question, a composer submits to the market by employing 
those creative means that maximise the possibility that the 
subject can make an uninterrupted transition from passive 
consumer to passive listener: only through this route can the 
distinction between department store commodity and cultural 
artefact be successfully collapsed. Tonality, in whatever 
generalised and degraded form this may take, in conjunction with 
ersatz religion and spirituality, literary reference, quotation, and 
autobiography, fulfil this function with military-style precision. 
The main absentee from this space is the medium. And the high 
modernist programme represents the primary response and 
alternative to this process, but the costs of pursuing it in this 
current political climate are great. 
IP : I'd like to pursue the issue of appropriation further: let's 
return to Adorno, who privileged the less explicitly 'political' work 
of Samuel Beckett as against that of Brecht, which he felt was 
more amenable to absorption and appropriation by the 'culture 
industry'. In Brecht's case, it has been argued that the crude 
didacticism of a play like Arturo Ui lends itself to this process - by 
its excessively individualistic focus, it is unable to probe deeper 
into the historical conditions that makes the rise of such an 
individual possible. As such, the play's ability to project into our 
own times also becomes limited. 
Nowadays, there are plenty of people who pay homage to Luigi 
Nono as a 'great composer', and are quite happy with his 1960s 
and early 1970s works without any need to engage with their 
politics (other than as a type of 'radical chic', whereby subjects 
such as Vietnam, Chile, Auschwitz seem harmless when viewed 
from a safe historical distance). I would argue that the earlier and 
later works of Nono, through their qualities of displacement, 
alienation, fragmentation and denial, constitute a much 
more politically powerful alternative to that which is offered by 
commodity consumer culture nowadays. Would you agree with 
this? 
GD: Appropriation works at different levels. In recent years, Nono 
has become a useful symbol for a newly formed lumpen-avant-
garde that, whilst seeking to maintain ideological and critical 
distance from power, seeks a spokesperson from within the 
movement who offers an alternative engagement to what they 
perceive as the cultural and ideological impasse caused by a 
purely high modernist cultural programme. With arguments that 
are closer to fiction than genuine critical enquiry, all such 
positions merely obscure what is already an unmistakable and 
unavoidable reality. 
IP: In the case of Beckett, many could plausibly argue that his 
work (at least the plays) has equally been absorbed into the 
'culture industry'. I'd think of it slightly differently, in a context 
which is especially pertinent to music: it has been possible to 
perform Beckett in such a manner as to tame the apocalyptic 
qualities of his work, as well as the terminally black humour, by 
casting members of the 'luvvie brigade' (Jeremy Irons, Alan 
Rickman, Juliet Stevenson, etc.), whose commodified acting style 
(repertoire of taught gestures, body language always revealing 
the lack of genuine identification on the part of the 
actors/actresses) places the work at a safe distance, and thus 
makes it more amenable to the purposes of bourgeois 
entertainment. 
Parallel processes occur in the performance of modernist music. I 
read one review of a performance a few years ago of 
Stockhausen's Kreuzspiel , a work we both know and admire, 
which stated that the performance ' made this piece of utopian 
structuralism much more than cerebral abstraction ' and that the 
pianist brought 'wit' to the piano part. I can only cringe at the 
thought of how this performance would have looked and sounded. 
In music that strives so hard to exceed and transcend inherited 
categories of expression that have descended into idle 
mannerism, can performance practice not serve an ideological 
purpose of its own by 'historicising' a piece of music in this sort of 
way? A piece of music that is made to sound sufficiently rooted in 
dated modes of expression, with minimal mediation, can much 
more successfully satisfy the demands of the middlebrow 
entertainment industry. 
GD: I think you are identifying the subtle and various ways in 
which appropriation or recuperation can take place. Clearly, for 
any cultural artefact to be absorbed, it has to be transformed to 
make it amenable to administration. But I would argue that this 
process operates most successfully at the level of material. In 
this way, the reproduction of those values and ideologies 
essential for maintaining capital, is made an essentially automatic 
process, as the very materials composers or visual artists use 
come ready-processed or ready-formed, or even ready-marketed. 
Attempts to process Stockhausen or Beckett post hoc are largely 
clumsy, though your particular example is striking for the level of 
inanity and incompetency that it exhibits. Unfortunately, 
commentators like this have conspicuous platforms upon which to 
disseminate their ignorance. But it continues to be the case that 
high modernist art is generally absent from the cultural field, and 
this is particularly the case for music. But its absence is an index 
of its continued resistance to processes of appropriation. Put 
simply, how can they market it? 
IP : So, would you agree that a wilful historicisation is part of the 
appropriation procedure (in the sense of reducing modernism to a 
historical category whose time is past)? 
GD : Most certainly. High modernism gains much of its critical 
power from its claims to historical objectivity and transcendence. 
Periodising the programme enables neo-conservatives to safely 
acknowledge its relevance whilst pursuing political agendas that 
are otherwise wholly reactionary and revisionary. But this process 
is also internal to the movement. Boulez's own appropriation and 
privatisation of this programme enables his continued dominance 
of the movement despite his more recent conservative 
tendencies. 
IP : It has recently been shown (not least by Frances Stonor 
Saunders in her book Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the 
cultural Cold War ) how the rise to international prominence of 
American abstract expressionist artists and others was in part 
made possible by CIA funding (craftily channelled through a 
variety of 'front' organisations so as to obscure the true source). 
In light of this, should we think again about questions of 
'historical inevitability' in terms of the success of some modern 
art movements? 
GD : One could list other, more recent interventions that distort 
the field of cultural production, whether it's Saatchi's patronage 
of a whole generation of young British artists whose work is 
created in their sponsor's mercenary image, or Frank Zappa 
hiring Pierre Boulez and the EIC to perform, promote, and 
legitimate his music. One could also question whether the 
extreme turn to the right in new music in recent years might 
have its roots in similar neo-conservative interventions. Certainly, 
both Adès and Adams have benefited considerably from such 
covert action channelled overtly through the Grawemeyer and 
Nemmers 'prizes'. (The award of such prizes to composers such 
as Harrison Birtwistle, incidentally, should not deflect us from this 
analysis. Despite its apparently hard surface, music of this kind is 
imbued with that particular flavour of pragmatism and 
compromise which is an essential ingredient of British pseudo 
radicalism, which in this case mistakes ugliness for rigour and 
seriousness of intent and hands the bourgeois victory on a plate: 
after all, knighthoods and genuine aesthetic radicalism are wholly 
incompatible). Clearly, the intervention at state intelligence level 
that Stonor Saunders reveals is of another order. But if her 
assertions are correct, then it is doubtful that abstraction would 
have reached the level of international dominance that it did 
without such intervention. And this would conform to the 
historical norm and explain why other, more radical forms of 
abstraction, such as the constructions of Charles Biederman, for 
example, which did not enjoy covert US government sponsorship, 
remained largely neglected and ignored by authority and the 
critical establishment. This helps to counter any argument that 
radical modernism of this kind is, in fact, some form of 
fabrication, and more or less a creation of power for the assertion 
of cultural hegemony. Rather, abstract expressionism was 
appropriated by power opportunistically for reasons already 
outlined. And the controversial nature of much of the work and 
the personalities producing it, some of whom exhibited 
hedonistic, self-destructive lifestyles which usefully reproduced 
romantic visions of the aesthetic life, offered useful tools of 
promotion: the intellection involved in construction sells fewer 
weekend supplements. 
But we should also question the motivations behind such critiques 
of high modernism, and consider whether critiques and 
revisionary analyses of this kind are driven by neo-conservative 
or feminist agendas that, though emanating from very different 
positions, share a common aim to discredit or relativise the high 
modernist programme. 
IP: If a high modernist agenda is vulnerable to feminist critique, 
should one not question it? 
GD : It's quite clear that in Capital Marx made little room for 
gender in his analysis of capitalism. The more separatist strands 
of feminism that view patriarchy as more significant in the 
creation of social divisions than either class or race have only 
contributed, I would argue, to the continued weakening of the 
organised left and its apparent impotency in the face of global 
capital domination. Feminist critiques of aesthetic modernism are 
similarly focused and analyse the internationalising and 
rationalising impetus of the movement as aesthetic imperialism or 
patriarchy. Again, such masculinisation only serves to factionalise 
and weaken forces of liberation and enlightenment, a particularly 
tragic waste of time if gender is in any case socially constructed 
to serve forms of labour division intrinsic to capitalist economics. 
IP : Many of the abstract expressionist painters (most obviously 
Pollock) created wild cults of personality around themselves. John 
Cage did so as well, despite all his rhetoric to the contrary, as did 
Morton Feldman. I hardly need to mention Stockhausen. The 
media love this, enabling them to displace attention from the art 
to the artist. But do you think this had an impact upon the work 
itself, or is totally separable? 
GD : It's regrettable that creative artists appear so willing to 
succumb to this kind of cultism, so willing to allow themselves, as 
subjects, to become as important (or more so) than their creative 
programmes. But you pose an interesting question, and as you 
say, Stockhausen's career trajectory is a perfect instance of this. 
If we examine his work from the 1950s, by considering pieces 
such as Kontra-Punkte , Gruppen , or the early Klavierstücke , 
these works have an aesthetic comportment largely in k
with the objectivising, internationalising spirit of the high 
modernist programme. To a significant degree they denounce the 
subject in favour of the collective: this is always a stronger 
option. One of the complaints customarily made against this 
music is that it all sounds the same. Notwithstanding the extent 
to which this is an over-simplistic over-statement, I consider this 
to be one of its potential strengths, signifying a transferral of 
notions of collective ownership, and a rejection of individualism, 
to the aesthetic. Though it is interesting to consider how 
Stockhausen's later period text or intuitive scores examine 
musical process at very fundamental levels, one could be forgiven 
for thinking that this analysis is a by-product of a musical 
development that enables Stockhausen-as-subject to be 
foregrounded, due to the social and more marketable form that 
this work took, enabling a transition of relative ease into the 
pages of Rolling Stone and Melody Maker . Such displacement of 
attention does have an impact on the art produced, and it is a 
feature of much cultural production. In this sense (if in no other) 
as Cardew asserted, Stockhausen really did serve imperialism, 
and it is a major contributor to this composer's increasing decline 
as a creative force from the 1970s onwards. But Stockhausen has 
always exhibited a level of careerism that has compromised his 
production, whether it's the conceptual inanity 
of Klavierstück XI or the abdication of critical perspective 
in Klavierstück III . His most recent work is surely unworthy of 
commentary. 
2. 
IP : Do you see your work in part as a strategy of negation, a 
word which has largely pejorative connotations in English, though 
very different resonances in Germanic idealist parlance (the 
process of negation, of critique, is a stage on the process of 
sublation ( Aufheben ) on the path towards higher knowledge; 
English empiricism is profoundly sceptical about such a thing ever 
being really possible)? Also, would you say there is a certain 
'classicism' in your work and that of the modern movement in 
general (in whatever medium)? 
GD : I understand and employ the concept of negation in broadly 
two ways. Firstly, with reference to set-theoretic practice, it 
functions as a formal strategy to manage change and difference, 
to determine both linear and vertical structure, relationships, and 
incident, in order to control the levels of difference and similarity 
that these structures exhibit. Direct reference is made to this 
process, for example, in the suffix to forms 5: event 
intersection , in which every aspect of the work is governed by 
set operations of this kind, though I increasingly find that a more 
flexible approach can be obtained using fuzzy, rather than fully 
crisp set operations and structures. It is in this sense, perhaps, 
that work of this kind can be termed classical, though this isn't a 
term I generally use due to its unwanted connotations. Its 
emphasis on formalised and verifiable modes of practice, most 
commonly mathematical models or systems which are inevitably 
objective and externalised in nature, indicate a concern for 
standards of practice which subordinate individualism to more 
collective aims. This, I suppose, is a form of classicism, and may 
be what you mean. Underpinning the whole of the constructionist 
programme is a concern for accountability of this kind. This 
transforms the role of the artist, of course, and our current 
historical period is in large measure characterised by a reaction to 
this possibility. We should be unsurprised by the hostility 
initiated, for example, by integral serialism and similar modes of 
practice. Whilst art, functioning as surrogate religion, is viewed as 
a refuge, retreat, distraction, or escape from total administration, 
any practice that appears to replicate those features associated 
with total administration will be rejected, or not even recognised 
as aesthetic behaviour. 
It is in this second sense that I use the term negation, in order to 
delineate ones position and response to power, and what 
strategies one can employ to manage that response. Practice can 
either affirm dominant power relations by reproducing them in 
symbolic form (and tonality, as I outlined earlier, is a perfect 
vehicle for this), or attempt to negate those relations through a 
refusal to take ones allotted place in that superstructural network 
which functions to reproduce those relations at ever higher levels 
of abstraction. 
IP : All your compositional processes do still use the 'note' as the 
fundamental unit. Are you at all interested in extended 
instrumental techniques and the use of timbre individuated from 
pitch and rhythm? 
GD : As the phrase indicates, extended instrumental techniques 
involve the individualisation of instrumental performance and the 
radical idiomaticity of instrumental technique. If the projection 
and investigation of integrated, highly structured and cohering 
wholes forms the basis of ones creative practice and aesthetic 
programme, as it does in my own case, one will seek to avoid any 
feature which risks loosening or weakening those inter-
relationships and connectivities which are a pre-condition for such 
structures' successful implementation. The idioms of one 
instrument or instrumental family do not necessarily map on to 
the idioms of another, if at all. In consequence, the possibility of 
factoring out sufficient commonalities in order to construct 
integrated forms of organisation is, therefore, significantly 
weakened. Thus, to concentrate on 'the note' as the 'fundamental 
unit' is, for me, a recognition that, in order to suppress those 
forms of singularity that risk compromising the fully integrated 
whole, only those features exhibiting the highest levels of 
invariance constitute valid components of any organisational 
system or procedure. At this time then, my creative interests 
preclude the possibility of such techniques within the instrumental 
realm, though, given the flexibility of the human voice, I am 
interested in exploring extensions to this as a resource in the 
future. 
But there has been an assumption driving the extension and 
expansion of musical materials that all parameters can be 
subjected to similar levels of development and exploration, an 
assumption that concludes that a radically expanded notational 
repertoire, for example, can be accompanied by a similar 
expansion in timbral control. This assumption doesn't take into 
account the different operational and cognitive modalities that 
notation and timbre inhabit. Of course, we do have technological 
devices, computers, that offer composers, in principle at least, 
unlimited control over this complex parameter; and it is for this 
reason that the bulk of my creative and research energies during 
the 1980s were devoted to computer music synthesis and 
investigation. For this reason, I am at a loss to understand why 
composers strain the instrumental medium by placing demands 
upon musical instruments that they are unable to satisfy. As 
technological tools, they were not designed to manipulate and 
control timbre to a sophisticated degree. It's true, especially in 
the hands of highly accomplished performers, that interesting 
results can be obtained. But the contradictory nature of such 
research soon becomes apparent. To explore timbre, tools of 
exceptional analytical precision and sophistication are required, 
tools that are able to act upon sonic events, in parallel, at a 
highly multi-parametric level. Again, computers can do this with 
ease. At this time, I cannot imagine the physical constraints 
intrinsic to human physiognomy offering the means to explore 
instrumental timbre in this way. Attempts to do so risk inhabiting 
the special effects category of production or theatre. As such, 
they are highly singularised and risk compromising the internal 
integrity of any given structure. Thus, within instrumental music, 
I would claim that timbre cannot be individuated from pitch and 
rhythm to a sophisticated extent, so there is little point in 
pursuing it as a creative programme. It is for these reasons, and 
others, that my scores at this time do not specify any deliberate 
timbral modification or associated techniques of articulation. This 
even extends to 'standard' string techniques such as sul 
ponticello andflautando . 
I am fully aware, of course, that those instrumental resources 
available to composers at this time are to some extent arbitrary. 
But this does not mean that they are without an internal 
structuring which delimits their field of competency. This field 
cannot be arbitrarily enhanced or extended by operating on one 
modality without considering how those extensions propagate and 
affect inter-modal relationships, possibly in detrimental and 
unforeseen ways. I am also aware, of course, that in the hands of 
certain composers, the use of extended instrumental techniques 
has other functions, as either a means to deliberately undermine 
the medium itself or as an agitational device to attack bourgeois 
security and 'good taste'. I am not without sympathy for such 
positions. But for reasons I outlined earlier, there are more direct 
and efficient ways to subvert bourgeois expectations than this, 
even though the average bourgeois couldn't care less about such 
posturing. And I am also fully aware, once again, that my 
disinclination to adopt such practices coupled with a general 
tendency of the field to measure radicality in coarse, quantitative 
terms, risks relocating my own practice to the centre-left, thereby 
reducing its critical potency. 
IP : Well, the composer Helmut Lachenmann uses extended 
instrumental techniques in part precisely because they draw 
attention to themselves in live performance, foregrounding a 
certain non-posturing theatricality grounded in its literal 'means 
of production'. This serves as an antidote to a streamlined 
instrumental technique which seeks to erase the material-nature 
of instruments and performance for purposes of mystification, 
perhaps giving music-making a fetish quality as a rarefied music 
'from on high'. Of course, Lachenmann is also simply fascinated 
by timbre per se, using intricate strategies of contextualisation to 
make manifest an almost naïve (in the best sense of the word) 
love for the possibilities of sonority. This is quite different to a 
'means to deliberately undermine the medium itself' or 'an 
agitational device to attack bourgeois security and "good taste"', 
though some critics would like to co-opt Lachenmann into one of 
these camps. Do you believe this sort of compositional aesthetic 
to be of value?  
GD : This is an interesting programme that Lachenmann is 
exploring, but it is a programme that makes itself easy prey to 
the types of appropriation to which you refer. Indeed, its 
agitational and critical function is surely its primary focus and 
value? Again, I would have to repeat that if one is 'simply 
fascinated with timbre per se', then explore it using those tools 
that reward that fascination. 
But there is an important link here with aspects of my own 
practice that is most clearly explored in piano piece 2.  
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If Lachenmann's methods seek to recapture the means of 
production through processes of de-mystification, the notational 
devices utilised in piano piece 2 function to subvert and disable 
those processes of appropriation and recuperation beforethey 
occur.  
 
This resistance, I would claim, is embedded within the work's 
notational fabric and form. This exhibits a level of perceptual and 
operational complexity that acts as a barrier to unreflective, 
automatic realisation and reproduction. This is achieved through 
the radical re-specification of each successive impulse at every 
parametric level. The concentration upon the single impulse, or 
note, as the largest unit of organisation, acts as an efficient 
barrier to the formation of higher-level sensory units that are 
more susceptible to appropriation because of their (relative) ease 
of cognition. In combination with notational techniques that 
constantly mediate between high levels of determinacy and 
relative indeterminacy, the potential for resolving the polyvalent 
nature of the work, the possibility of the work reaching closure, 
the possibility of the work forming a conclusive identity, is 
constantly delayed and frustrated. In reply to Bourdieu, 
here, complexity is an act of resistance to processes of 
appropriation.  
3. 
IP: I'd like to ask if you can see anything of value in popular 
music and jazz, or in free improvisation? Would you subscribe to 
Adorno's views on these matters? 
GD : You're right that in all essentials I would subscribe to 
Adorno's position with regard to so-called popular music. I think I 
would have little to add to his analyses, which strike me as no 
less applicable now than when he wrote them. But I would ask 
you why are we still examining this question? Given our own 
activities, why is this still considered an important issue? Let's try 
to examine this in more detail than is often the case. Firstly, 
great difficulties surround the notion of 'value'. Does the music 
articulate something of value in terms of technical innovation or 
interest? Or does the music have value in developing critical 
consciousness, awareness, or maturity? And what exactly do we 
mean by pop music or jazz music? In terms of technical 
construction, popular chart music strikes me as exhibiting no 
harmonic, rhythmic, or formal characteristics that elevate it 
above the severely retarded. For a while, particularly during the 
1980s, the rapid development of synthesizers and associated 
signal processing devices enabled these moribund materials and 
forms to be projected in timbrally novel, though not necessarily 
richer, contexts. But whether projected using a Yamaha DX7 or a 
Fender Stratocaster, the materials stay either the same or, to 
paraphrase Brian Ferneyhough's words, progress from three-
chord, to one-chord, to zero-chord trickery. But this level of 
retardation is built into the form of division of labour that 
characterises the field. Pop tunes are unable to exceed the 
boundaries of complexity allowed by the short-term memory 
characteristic of head-arrangements. Only music notation enables 
such boundaries to be exceeded. As a synonym for the intellect, it 
is ironic that those arrangements manageable by the head are of 
an intellectual ambition and range that requires no intellect at all. 
But we should be unsurprised that pop stars seek to bypass those 
formal programmes of learning that would equip them with the 
required knowledge and skills to read and write: show business is 
the cultural wing of capital, and as such it has no time for 
anything that will slow down the process of capital accumulation 
and its symbolic forms, fame and celebrity. It is true, of course, 
that during the 1970s certain factions attempted to extend these 
basic ingredients. But if we examine, critically, the products of so-
called progressive rock, we find essentially the same harmonic 
and formal characteristics. Where there is an attempt at formal 
expansion, as in the work of Yes or King Crimson for example, 
the expansion takes place with no concomitant attention to 
change in other parameters, an essential consideration if those 
expanded forms are not to buckle under this new expressive 
weight. This strain is particularly evident, for example, in 
Yes's Tales from Topographic Oceans : where such pretension is 
still to some extent hidden in the Yes Album , the limitations here 
become unbearably evident which no amount of virtuoso 
electronic keyboard scale-work is able to hide. There is thus a 
level of incompetence here that has its origins in extreme 
ignorance; though of course, as we can hear in the scores of 
MacMillan and others of his ilk, such incompetence is not limited 
to rock'n'rollers. 
It is important to apply the same critical standards to this music 
that we do to all other musics. Only then does its truly retarded 
and reactionary nature become apparent. But it is still the case 
that such musics are given the benefit of the doubt. And it is 
extraordinary to see pop stars enjoying exceptional material 
wealth whilst simultaneously enjoying the suspension of belief 
that comes from the conferral of victimhood. This stems, I 
presume, from pop music's ancestry in certain (non-privileged) 
class factions. But if this were ever the case, rebellion has now 
joined the long list of other commodified and reified manners and 
images that make up the pop music industry style portfolio. 
Certain elements within high-cultural endeavour are far too 
tolerant of this process. 
But as pop music can take many forms which are in their 
foundation nevertheless virtually indistinguishable, this is 
frequently also the case with jazz. Where jazz similarly seeks a 
higher level of technical expansion, it frequently does so by 
simply mimicking and appropriating those resources developed 
within high-cultural endeavour, but without the critical focus 
characteristic of the latter, and often rather clumsily. But the nod, 
wink, and grin that is elicited from Dave Brubeck's irregular 
metrical and phrase structures merely reassures us that despite 
this abberation, everything's the same underneath. And such 
music aligns itself with all those other musics of an affirmatory 
nature that seek to hide their otherwise reactionary complexion 
beneath the thinnest veneer of modernity. As a propagandistic 
tool, syncopation just gives you the illusion of freedom. The 
position is no different when the nod, wink, and grin is replaced 
with a more learned demeanour: the main lesson to be learned 
from Tony Coe's use of Bergian twelve-note row structures in 
his Zeitgeist , is that for appropriation to go unnoticed, it has to 
be pursued far more wholesale and far more ruthlessly than we 
witness here. 
The main thing to come out of this is a repeat of my opening 
question: why are we still examining this? We are concerned with 
it, in part, because such musics constitute the primary weapon of 
response by those cultural theorists who view high modernist 
complexity as a means, as I stated earlier, to sustain unequal 
distributions of power. Such musics are also effective symbolic 
tools that neo-conservative composers ransack as a badge of 
market utility masked as fake camp. But I do not question 
cultural theorists' veracity. The British strand of this tendency 
emanates in large measure from those institutions to which 
university status has only recently been conferred. Just as such 
institutions exist to service expanding student enrolment from 
proletarian origins, so the demography of faculty members is not 
infrequently sourced from similarly proletarian or petit-bourgeois 
class factions where an adolescent encounter with high culture 
was replaced with products of the culture industry. The kind of 
critique characteristic of Stuart Hall is an example of this kind of 
class warfare. In this process the comparative 'value' of Britney 
Spears or Pierre Boulez is, of course, lost 
IP : In the eyes and ears of many serious aficionados of rock 
music, a band like Yes are hardly the epitome of a genuine 
'progressiveness', despite the label; punk sprang up in part as a 
reaction to this sort of navel-gazing work (akin perhaps to 
something like the symphonies of Robert Simpson?), a 
combination of narcissism and solipsism that was a huge 
distortion of the more 'engaged' work of 1960s bands such as the 
Soft Machine. While punk was undoubtedly appropriated and 
rendered harmless by the rock-music industry, I'd argue that 
there was still some quality of authentic engagement at the very 
outset, manifest in the first Sex Pistols album, say, whose 
potency remains relevant today. The same claim could be made 
for other key strategic moments in popular music history, or in 
the work of jazz musicians such as Charlie Mingus, Ornette 
Coleman or Cecil Taylor, say (and some earlier practitioners). Do 
you not see any potential in this type of work? 
GD : Like any other hobbyist, the aficionado is highly territorial, 
and will always seek to ring-fence their activity and enthusiasms 
in this way. Distinctions such as those you relate function to 
achieve this end. But within our context, to assert the 
revolutionary potential of the tendencies you cite is to radically 
over-estimate the extent to which this kind of epiphenomena has 
any significance to power. Persistent questioning about this is 
akin to being asked at dinner parties ones opinion of Beethoven. 
It's a call to conform. 
4. 
IP : In Britain and America today, and increasingly also 
elsewhere, the dominant aesthetic seems to be one 
of absorption , under the auspices of a certain post-modern 
pluralism which turns every aesthetic movement (including high 
modernism) into just one 'style' amongst many (relatively 
homogenised to make this possible, not least through 
performance practice); aesthetic choices from amongst these 
styles then resemble any other consumer activity. This attitude is 
especially prevalent amongst the younger generation (especially 
that group of people who were all at Cambridge together in the 
1980s) who have grown up in a world in which the values of 
Thatcherism have become 'normalised' and have shown little 
inclination to resist them. Much of the work of younger 
composers is depressingly familiar in this respect. How can or 
should one act to try and counteract this? 
GD : What has happened in the UK over the past twenty years or 
so would be described, in another context, as a coup d'état. The 
particular factions to which you allude form a monopoly which 
enjoys a near exclusive possession and control over many or all 
of the most significant resources available for new music 
production, performance, and dissemination. But, as you 
intimate, this has only been possible due to their willingness to 
subordinate creative autonomy and decision-making to the 
priorities of the market and to fashion their product in its 
mercenary image. What action can be taken to counteract this 
has far-reaching implications. Within the cultural field, politics 
and ideology are customarily masked as aesthetics. This being 
the case, acts of symbolic violence and oppression are accepted, 
interpreted, or, to use Bourdieu's formulation, misrecognised as 
objective characteristics of the field. Whilst this is the case, the 
product of contrivance and design is interpreted as fortuity, the 
product of favour and influence, as talent. As we see in other 
spheres where structures of democratic accountability and equity 
are absent, and where the possibility of engineering real change 
appears impossible, the response is frequently a resort to action 
of a more direct, less symbolic form. This may be the only 
effective route left open to us. 
IP : The sort of discussion we are having at the moment is, I 
think, quite markedly different in its nature, attitudes, language 
and ideological viewpoints to most of what characterises 
discourse about music in Britain . Such discourse more commonly 
comprises purple prose and blow-by-blow description, an almost 
adolescent fixation upon mystical personae of the individuals 
involved (with a lot of emphasis upon the bourgeois 
autobiography you rightly decried earlier), and a general 
aesthetic privileging of what might crudely be called the more 
titillating aspects of music. Discourse of this type is not merely an 
appendage to music, or a footnote to it, I believe: the discourse, 
in the form of hype and publicity, reviews, or simply the oral 
discourse that goes on between those involved with the 
administration of new music, is manifested at every level. Such 
discourse legitimises certain types of music, and delegitimises 
other work that exceeds the discursive categories employed. This 
seems a prima facie case of the means by which the discourse 
bullies the artistic work into the service of entertainment, in this 
particular British case. Would you agree with this? What are your 
thoughts on the role of 'words about music'? 
GD : I think you're isolating here a feature that penetrates our 
society at a very fundamental level, whether between individual 
subjects or between groups. It should, therefore, come as no 
surprise to us that music, like any other form of human 
communication, is reduced (wherever possible), to the same 
kinds of coarse discursive categories that you cite. Since the last 
aggressive reassertion of capital during the 1980s, contemporary 
music has finally been allotted its place in the leisure, heritage, 
and entertainment industries. This has been a gradual process, 
which remains incomplete. But it is one that has already 
transformed the field into a mere simulation of what we mean by 
contemporary music: even the term has been stolen from us, and 
we're unable to use it without qualification. This being the case, 
we should be unsurprised that the language used to describe or 
discuss it, takes a similar form, one that is as indistinguishable as 
possible from the language that is used to describe or discuss any 
other commodity in market society. And, once transformed into a 
commodity, the languages of advertising and marketing are 
deployed to sell it, which, of course, are languages of distortion, 
deceit, and propaganda. This accounts, I believe, for some of the 
more colourful prose that you rightly condemn. But what 
astonishes us, in part, is the extent to which composers so readily 
allow themselves to be subjected to these processes. 
But this process is an attack on complexity, a prohibition on 
thinking. Like the music it serves to sell, such language is an 
abdication of reflective and critical thought. Like the acronyms 
that so horrified Marcuse, reified language functions to delimit 
and control, what can be said or thought. In such a context 
thinking can only be restored by a radical critique or re-
formulation of those tools of discourse that we employ to explore 
and organise that thinking. This is the case with music, and this is 
the case with words. Many techniques can function as models of 
resistance, not least the fragmentary discourse and forms we 
associate with critical theorists such as Theodore Adorno. In my 
own case, the reader should also note my total disinclination to 
employ those conceptual categories that typify discourse on 
music, not only because of their inappropriateness to the task in 
hand, but because, having been fully appropriated, their 
signifying capacity is no longer under our control. This being the 
case, one must find or invent new discursive and critical 
categories that will once more enable authentic communication to 
take place. From a wider perspective, this also accounts for my 
rejection of forms of labour division that constrain and order 
thinking by imprisoning it in domain-specific language. For this 
and other reasons, I map categories of discourse from one 
domain (such as computer science, anthropology, sociology, 
evolutionary psychology, or psycho-acoustics) to re-form the 
conceptual framework of another. Thus, my preference for the 
term temporal partitioning rather than rhythm, for example, is 
not only driven by a desire for conceptual and discursive 
precision, but also a realisation that the term rhythm has become 
semantically overloaded with connotations and denotations which 
I am unable to control. 
But most importantly, we need to make a distinction between 
speech and writing. You use the term 'words', which leaves me 
unclear to which you refer. Speech, more than writing, lends itself 
more easily to those processes of reification and appropriation 
that kill authentic communication. This is due to the context in 
which speech is the dominant discursive and communicational 
format, such as we find in mass communicational systems. It is 
to this process that Bourdieu so horrifyingly refers in describing 
those processes of discourse management commonly employed in 
television and radio broadcasts, where the sheer speed of 
interaction prohibits the kind of reflective thought necessary to 
prevent the subject's decline into automatism. Without such 
reflection, the subject is prone, or forced, to employ more or less 
prefabricated units of speech that carry with them a semantic 
content, the intent or meaning of which has been taken out of the 
hands, or mouths, uttering them. To paraphrase Guy Debord, 
inarticulateness in this context is a sign of extreme 
enlightenment. 
More generally, one could argue that artists should write more 
and create less. By remaining mute about their work, they leave 
it open to manipulation by others. Historically, artists' letters are 
one of the primary sources that scholars can use to analyse their 
thinking. This being the case, we should be unsurprised at the 
infantile, shallow form that much writing about music has taken: 
this is not a recent phenomenon. But we might consider whether 
the hostility that has accompaniedintellectualised art (various 
forms of constructionism being the primary examples), stems, in 
part, from such artists disinclination to allow others, whether 
researchers or critics, to speak for them. Disempowered, the 
critic fights back by championing the mute and the dumb. 
IP : How important is progressive aesthetic activity in 
comparison to explicit political activism? Have you ever been 
involved in the latter? 
GD : As I believe I intimated earlier, I am sceptical about the 
ability of art to effect direct, political change. If that's what you 
want, then use more appropriate and direct tools of engagement. 
But for intellectuals of the left, organised political activity offers 
an inhospitable context within which to do this, given the left's 
commitment to a proletarian dictatorship in which radical social 
change must be initiated from below. As I stated earlier, given 
that the proletariat are themselves a product of capital, and 
represent a low revolutionary potential, I would advocate a model 
along the lines proposed by Isaac Deutscher and others, in which 
a radical intellectual vanguard guides this process through 
enlightened leadership. No current organisation of the left dare 
advocate such a programme publicly, because of its Stalinist and 
Maoist overtones. However, the internal divisions within the left 
are such that it remains a largely ineffective force against global 
capital. But art of a progressive and critical nature offers a 
context for encouraging and developing critical consciousness and 
awareness, which is a precondition for significant social change, 
and it can give glimpses of what currently seems an impossibility. 
IP : Might the consciousness of radical bourgeois figures like 
either of us not still reflect some of the human interests of our 
class, as opposed say to that of a shop steward? Aren't there 
intrinsic dangers in our aesthetic projects in that respect, 
operating aloof from the broad masses of humanity? What 
relevance might such work have to a late-teenage girl working in 
a sweatshop in the Far- East for a big multinational corporation, 
say? 
GD : What we do has no relevance to the workers to which you 
refer, and it's preposterous, of course, to suggest that it does or 
should, given the oppressive nature of the conditions that such 
workers are forced to endure. But I am at a loss to understand 
why your examples are taken from the bottom or lower end of 
the socio-economic spectrum. What we do has no relevance to 
the vast majority of workers, whether in a Far-East sweatshop, a 
legal firm, hospital consultancy, corporate board room, or 
university faculty. It strikes me that there are two fundamental 
and inter-connected reasons for this. Firstly, as Susan Sontag 
correctly observed, advanced modern art requires a level of 
intellectual engagement and cultivation akin to that required for 
physics, higher mathematics, computing, or any other of the 
advanced sciences. Generally, extreme divisions of labour prevent 
this kind of comprehension. I am a computer scientist, and rarely 
is it asked whether sciences should be understood by or have a 
relevance to, non-specialists or those with little formal education: 
issues of accountability are of a different kind. The question is 
posed within cultural production because there is a general 
assumption or expectation that art should be comprehensible to 
everyone, with or without the requisite educational foundation; 
indeed, art is deemed faulty if it requires this. The source of this 
assumption is, in part, the use of culture as a means to 
implement forms of pseudo-democratic accountability within a 
cultural context that is largely irrelevant to the wider political 
decision-making process. Due to its impotence, liberalising 
culture is a cheap way to fake democracy. Secondly, advanced 
intellectual activity of this kind, whether in the arts or sciences, is 
rarely given access to those mechanisms and channels of 
communication, such as television, radio, or the press, that would 
allow this process of education, or enlightenment, to take place. 
This is a form of censorship, a prohibition on the most complex 
and advanced products of society being made available to all of 
those who would wish to access them. There are two solutions to 
this problem. Either one works to eradicate this socio-economic 
system and erect an alternative to it, or, as the cultural theorists 
would recommend, reformulate our activity to enable its easier 
navigation through this system with a view to subverting it from 
inside. Our cultural terrain is littered with examples of the latter 
that only results in culture enlisting itself into the service of 
power through a poor appropriation and simplistic re-formulation 
of political-reformist and ersatz military strategy.  
5. 
IP : Is there a place for the irrational in yours and others' music? 
Do the high rationalist procedures and aesthetics you employ 
have a type of quasi-mystical significance for you? 
GD : Most art feeds off and is based on the irrational and the 
illogical, and makes little sense as a result: this is the norm for 
art. As the possibility of God recedes, for those seeking an 
alternative refuge, art becomes a useful surrogate for religion and 
other forms of so-called mystical belief. And many composers are 
happy with this state of affairs as it relieves them of the 
responsibility to properly account for their creative decision-
making, and enables them to mask their incompetence as 
humility. 
But this is now just one more form of entertainment. My own 
techniques of composition have no significance to me greater 
than the structural and intellectual elegance that mathematical 
systems of thought intrinsically offer us: they are already 
fascinating and offer us efficient tools with which to model, 
structure, and explore our thinking. I can think of no alternative 
to basing ones actions on reason and associated logical 
processes. They strike me as the most effective weapon against 
the anarchy and irrationalism that is at the foundation of capital. 
IP : Late post-modern capitalism attempts to channel irrational 
human qualities, including desire and sexuality, into pigeonholed 
categories that lose their force of purpose by that very action. I'm 
personally interested in radical sexuality as one possible arena in 
which some modicum of human desire can still exist in a form not 
totally occupied by the demands of capitalist society (though of 
course this is by no means easy to maintain, the forces of 
commodification lurk like barbarians outside the gates as much as 
in any other field of human activity). In music the concomitant 
quality might be a continuing attempt to convey something 
resembling authentic human emotion, though not of course in the 
commodified form beloved of neo-romantics, who render such 
possibilities utterly inert and stillborn. The more abstracted 
rationalism that you would seem to espouse is certainly important 
in times dominated by the type of 'instrumental reason' identified 
by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (by 
which reason assumes a purely utilitarian role, whose importance 
is seen purely in terms of its use-value, for building nuclear 
weapons or the maintenance of capitalist economic hegemony); 
nonetheless, mightn't the Enlightenment project itself contain 
some essential limitations? When total administration is the 
driving force in contemporary society, is there not something to 
be said, aesthetically speaking, for an attempt to convey that 
which lies beyond the boundaries of such administration (two 
very different composers who to my ears achieve something of 
this are Michael Finnissy and Hans-Joachim Hespos)? This is the 
reason why some have suggested that genuine romanticism could 
actually be a major threat to post-modernism. Or do you think 
such attempts are futile and doomed from the outset? 
GD : Capital has appropriated the languages of mathematics, 
science, and reason to serve the interests of power and capital 
accumulation. We should be unsurprised, therefore, that subjects 
recoil when faced with cultural products that enlist those very 
same processes of rational organisation, systematisation, and 
construction, as it reminds them of their enslavement to total 
administration. But you are advocating the exploration or 
liberation of primary drives as a way to force holes through the 
administrational fabric. Every social order creates the personality 
types necessary for its preservation. As submissiveness to 
authority is a pre-requisite for such preservation, strategies that 
offer the possibility of liberating dissent through restructuring 
such types offers us a potentially powerful space of engagement. 
But given the way in which such drives are appropriated, 
channelled, and exploited, it would appear that no sooner do such 
opportunities for dissent arise than they are neutralised. In this 
sense, the forms of liberation that interest you are no more 
privileged than any other. So we keep returning to the power of 
capital to absorb dissent, and perhaps it is that process that 
requires our critical analysis.  
6.  
IP : In your work, you seem to avoid mimetic connotations 
almost entirely, whether in terms of the properties of the musical 
material, or even in the titles (which generally have a 'formalist' 
quality). Do you think there is a place for 'descriptive' or 
'evocative' music? 
GD : New evolutionary-psychological research suggests the 
adaptive and survival function that an intimate understanding of 
the natural or external environment offers organisms. There is 
thus a reciprocal relationship between fitness and performance in 
this environment. This being the case, we should be unsurprised 
at the extent to which depictions of that environment, however 
specific or generalised, dominate aesthetic media and 
representation. Landscapes, for example, which are often 
depicted from vantage points which offer the viewer necessary 
protection from predators, can be seen in this context as analyses 
of such environments. And such an observation could be 
extended to narrative forms and literary representations that 
similarly function to analyse and comprehend the hominoid, social 
environment. At this historical juncture, however, such adaptive 
behaviours are arguably functionless, and are leftovers from our 
developmental, evolutionary history where an intimate 
understanding or knowledge of the savannah, for example, was 
crucial to survival. But these are merely medium-specific 
examples of how mimetic behaviour assists the maintenance of 
subject homeostasis and stability. Through the creation and/or 
use of stable, unambiguous referents (or images from the life-
world) mimesis is particularly effective in lessening the perceptual 
and information-processing burden that subjects might otherwise 
experience. By rejecting such strategies, non-mimetic art media 
disrupt this process. 
We should be unsurprised then, at the extent to which non-
representational art, in all media, has been greeted with hostility. 
Where it has not, then its real nature has been misunderstood. 
And although certain categories of abstract expressionism (which 
still retain, to varying degrees, traces of the real) have enjoyed 
both significant patronage and public enthusiasm (even if CIA-
manufactured), constructive art, as I intimated earlier, has been 
relatively ignored or rejected (I know of no reference by Clement 
Greenberg, who was instrumental in propagating abstraction, to 
such art). This is due to its connection to the life-world being 
more efficiently severed. And this hostility derives from the 
artwork's refusal to affirm nature or, when the two are different, 
bourgeois expectations: mimesis is the bourgeoisies' way of 
insisting on arts utility. But the extent to which music is mimetic 
is poorly, if at all, understood. Once we perceive that the role of 
mimesis is to assist the maintenance of subject homeostasis, we 
are in a better position to understand which aspects of music 
function to achieve this end; and the very term, mimesis, is in 
need of additional conceptual treatment and refinement to enable 
its application to psychological and physiological categories in a 
more precise and meaningful manner. Clearly, each aesthetic 
medium emphasises a different modality of perception and 
cognition. Auditive media, or music, act upon primarily temporal 
modalities; and music is mimetic when it functions to reflect, 
reinforce, or re-create the temporal organisation of the subject's 
internal or external environment. And as there is a performance 
and adaptive advantage in partitioning experience into identifiable 
and recurrent patterns, patterns that have both an ecological and 
biological foundation, we should be unsurprised that to 
successfully reinforce this, music is organised in a similar way. 
But the more complexly such patterns are disrupted or the more 
thoroughly they are negated, the less music functions to affirm 
such expectations. Indeed, psycho-physiological research, 
indicating changes in neuroendocrine and cardiorespiratory 
activity, begins to support this contention, indicating the links 
between physiology and auditive input, and their concomitant 
affective responses and arousal potential. And the more 
reinforced such responses become, the greater the potential for 
the link between autonomic, physiological responses, and 
dominant ideologies, to be established: we need a Marxist 
physiology to supplement those psycho-analytic researches and 
perspectives initiated by the Frankfurt School . And 
expectations will be negated the moment the medium is 
prioritised, which is the central operational tenet informing high 
modernist practice. And it is at this point that the medium attains 
autonomy, that its aesthetic function is foregrounded. So in 
answer to your question, the avoidance of mimesis is a result of 
foregrounding the medium. 
But I'm not sure how to answer whether there's a place for 
'descriptive' or 'evocative' music. Despite ones intentions, the 
meaning listeners attach to ones work are out of ones control, 
especially if they are naïve or uninformed listeners, which is the 
norm. But I realise that there is a sub-text to your question, 
which is making reference to work which is overtly exploitative of 
stereo-typical modes of expression and assorted reified styles, 
manners, and images. This practice dominates much new music 
production today. So when we encounter titles such as To Fields 
We Do Not Know , A Deep but Dazzling Darkness , Higglety 
Pigglety Pop!, and A Short Ride in a Fast Machine , we know that 
the composer is sending the consumer a re-assuring message 
that they are safe in the composer's hands and that the product 
will contain little or nothing that will disrupt the consumer's 
expectations. Forms 5: event intersection , Structures , 
or Kreuzspiel , send out different messages that direct the reader 
to issues surrounding the works' construction. So, is there a place 
for 'descriptive' or 'evocative' music? Yes, and that place is a 
social formation that seeks to subordinate all activities to the 
priorities of the market - which is what we have now. In such a 
context, cultural production has to assume its allotted place 
within the heritage, leisure, and entertainment industries, and be 
of a complexion that offers little or no risk that the distractive 
function of those industries will be disrupted. 
IP : How about a work such as Xenakis's Aroura , or 
Messiaen's Catalogue d'Oiseaux , or even before them works of 
Debussy or Beethoven and many others that allude to nature? 
Would you really say that those works are entirely subsumable in 
the social formation you have just described? 
GD : My comments here are targeted primarily at current trends 
and are thus historically located. But I would question any 
tendency that aimed to sustain the subject in a state of 
enchantment, which exploits nature as a mechanism of retreat, 
and as a romanticised antidote to technical-rational 
administration. I realise that the logical outcome of the 
programme that I advocate is the abolition of art as we 
customarily understand it. But this is a central tenet of aesthetic 
modernisation. 
IP : Do you see your individual works as relatively self-contained 
entities, or the body of work as a whole as a more continuous 
project, from which separate works form a connected part of an 
on-going aesthetic 'discourse'? 
GD : Very much the latter. As a creative programme, this is most 
obviously articulated in my forms series, but the smaller works 
such as the piano pieces are no less connected to this process - 
they just have a different emphases, which is in part due to their 
more timbrally focused and delimited nature. A more precise 
understanding of the issues generated by the series can be 
gained by invoking the sciences of cognition and perception, 
which offer a wealth of research, terminology, and analytical 
perspectives of great relevance. And as a computer scientist I am 
always keen to associate my practice with science whenever 
possible. One of the most important features of the forms series 
is its systematic and analytical attention to a more or less well 
defined set of technical and aesthetic issues. These include pitch 
relations and structures, gestural profiling, and density, temporal, 
order, and proximity relations of various kinds. The series as a 
whole thus forms an attentional set or collection exhibiting high 
levels of intra-set invariance. In effect, each work exhibits high 
levels of similarity to all the others. Thus, where they differ will 
take on an increasingly significant status. This aids processes of 
parametric foregrounding, whereby parameters customarily 
hidden due to their encapsulation and embededness in higher-
order structures, are accessed and promoted to the perceptual 
foreground. This enables the avoidance of featural singletons that 
would draw attention to the particular, as my concern here is to 
draw attention to high level, abstract commonalities. The best 
way to do this, I believe, is by lowering the difference threshold 
between those works which are the vehicles through which such 
abstractions are explored: if two works only differ on a limited 
range of the scale, we are forced to pay attention to these 
differences at a higher level of detail than would otherwise be the 
case. The problem of addressing such issues within asingle work 
is that such difference is then mistakenly perceived as dialectical, 
with all the problems that arise from such coarsely fabricated 
conceptions. Composers and musicologists usually describe this 
as contrast, whereas they really mean a level of distinctness 
which places grave doubts on the coherence of the percepts in 
question: the terms 'section' and 'movement' are routinely 
deployed to mask this logical deficit. I would hope that the 
similarity this has to processes of scientific research and 
methodology, and the incremental and systematic nature that 
this endeavour usually takes, is apparent. 
But it has implications that go beyond 'mere' aesthetics. One of 
the most obvious means by which cultural products assume the 
role of commodities , is how successfully they control and 
manipulate supply and demand. Within cultural production, this is 
most commonly achieved through the manufacture of scarcity. 
The more singular and exceptional a cultural product is, and the 
more iconic its status, the greater value it achieves. And this 
status is most obviously achieved through maximal 
differentiation, as this is the perceptual modality that is most 
successful in arousing the attention of subjects, as experiments 
have conclusively shown. If I write the letter 'a' in fifteen different 
fonts, none will stand out from this display set to the same extent 
as a letter 'b' interspersed in red ink. Within cultural production, a 
whole set of terms are used to register this effect, such as 
'original', 'distinctive', innovative', 'ground-breaking', and the like, 
such terms functioning as the basic hyperbolic critical repertoire 
of the critical community that would otherwise have little idea 
what to say. It is thus interesting to note to what extent subjects' 
appraisal of aesthetic objects is determined by neuro-
physiological programming of this kind, and how ideologies of 
domination can be engineered to exploit them. We also need a 
Marxist branch of perception studies. But such a working method, 
with its emphasis upon notions of collectivity, is also an attack, 
within an aesthetic context, on private ownership. In 
consequence, I am most interested in that art which prioritises 
processes of this kind. Examples within visual art and architecture 
are far more common than in music. One could cite the work of 
Piet Mondrian, Richard Lohse, and Anthony Hill as models, in 
addition to architectural internationalism. 
IP : In your forms cycle, the listener is likely to be first struck by 
the relationship between density of events, as the most obviously 
perceptible aural level. Could you explain how the macroscopic 
'architecture' of a highly active work such as forms 5: event 
intersection for 30 players is arrived at? How does this relate to 
the quasi-serial procedures employed at more microscopic levels 
of composition? 
GD : forms 5: event intersection is characterised by a process 
of mediation between extremes of point density. Two extremes 
are established of high density on the one hand, and low density 
- or sparsity - on the other. The two extremes are then mediated 
to produce a seven-element scale of density, or notes per unit of 
time, from high to low. This scalic organisation is then 
permutated to produce seven distinct series or arrangements. 
This basic structure forms the high level architecture of the work. 
Once again, negation dictates the particular ordering that each 
series takes, whereby juxtapositions are chosen that emphasise 
maximum differentiation. This process contributes to the highly 
dynamic and active surface to which you refer. In order to 
appreciate the manner in which this high-level organisation is 
manifested at other, lower levels of organisation, it is necessary 
to grasp the importance of mediation and negation. They are the 
principal organisational features of this work and the forms series 
as a whole, and determine not only the large-scale architecture, 
as I have outlined, but the behaviour, progression, and 
parametric complexion of sequences of individual notes. This 
process accounts for the high level of differentiation sequences of 
notes exhibit in terms of registral position, contour, dynamic, 
duration, and timbre. The superimposition of these processes, to 
which the work's suffix refers, generates a highly dynamic and 
differentiated aural image, that is nevertheless highly unified due 
to its foundation in an integrated and consistent organisational 
scheme. 
IP : The rhythmic notation of your piano piece 2 is on a whole 
new level of complexity compared to piano piece 1 . What 
occasioned this notational shift? 
GD : I should start by indicating my aversion to the 
term rhythm . It is insufficiently precise in our context and comes 
with unwanted connotations. I prefer the phrase temporal 
partitioning . For new music, we need a new language. 
The notations developed in piano piece 2 function to further 
emphasise the autonomy of the point , or the single note. This is 
achieved through the hyper-re-specification of the parametric 
profile of each successive impulse, in terms which include 
duration, intensity, and register. In addition to fractional 
durations, this level of point autonomy is further heightened by 
the use of fractional meter and the additional techniques of 
articulation that their use generates, such as impulse tiling , 
where the start points of primary note values are fractionally 
staggered, and durational migration , which de-couples impulse 
time from impulse duration. Time intervals between successive 
points are then defined using thirteen relationships. Omitting 
their inverses, all interval relations between two events, a and b , 
can be captured and organised using the following six 
relationships, in addition to equality: a precedes b, a adjoins b, 
a overlaps b, a starts b, a is during b, a ends b, and a equalsb. 
Clearly, such relations can be nested to arbitrary levels of 
complexity. Abstracting time relations in this way further 
emphasises the independence of individual impulses, as 
their actual temporal location is more or less indeterminate 
(though still within very narrow bounds of probability), frustrating 
both the performer's and listener's attempt to extract from the 
music's surface shapes or sensory units that are superordinate to 
the single note. Larger-scale structures can be organised to 
determine invariant relationships that control the progression of 
musical events throughout the work. 
IP : What is the basis upon which you choose the particular 
configurations of instruments you employ? 
GD : As I have already indicated, negation is one of the primary 
formal tools structuring my music. The choice of instruments is 
governed by this principle. Thus, the instrumental configurations 
that I use emphasise maximal timbral differentiation. This 
becomes more apparent in the larger works such as forms 5: 
event intersection and forms 6: event aggregates , where all 
instrumental families are represented. Within particular works, 
sub-ensembles also function as attributes or features of event-
types, which are also characterised by gestural profile, duration, 
tempo, and impulse-density, for example. Instrumental 
configuration is in this instance part of a wider organisational 
principle, functioning to control the progression of colour contrast 
and volume, and various levels of density and activity throughout 
the work. forms 3:equivalent forms , for example, is 
constructed from seven event-types and each is characterised by 
seven configurations of one, three, five, seven, nine, eleven, and 
thirteen instruments. Such organisational techniques are 
particularly effective projected within very large forces, as 
opportunities are created for superimposing such processes in 
very diverse and complex ways. forms 6: event 
aggregates begins this process which forms 7 will extend much 
further. 
IP : forms 3: equivalent forms for 13 players in particular 
seems to present a highly 'egalitarian' relationship between the 
different instrumentalists. Do you see any sort of innate 
hierarchies between instruments, and if so is this something you 
try to counteract? Would you consider writing a work for soloist 
and ensemble? 
GD : The suffix to forms 3: equivalent forms points to one of 
the main concerns of both this particular work and my practice in 
general. Though equivalence is a notion central to integral 
serialism, it is also a dominant conceptual tenet of many of the 
most significant movements in 20 th century visual art and 
architecture, such as De Stijl; and Stockhausen's concept of 
mediation is essentially equivalence with another name, though 
more formally conceptualised. Equivalence posits the rejection of 
hierarchical structuring in favour of heterarchical structuring. In a 
heterarchical structure, all components are assigned equivalent 
status. This formal concern penetrates the organisation of forms 
3: equivalent forms at every level, and accounts for the 
'egalitarian' relationships that I attempt to establish in the 
distribution of the thirteen instruments. But this can only be 
achieved by demoting the primacy of pitch in order that 
percussion instruments such as temple blocks, wood blocks, and 
tom toms, can compete more equally with other members of the 
ensemble, in order to mediate between pitch and noise, or 
between the fully discrete and the continuous. This is achieved by 
employing pitch structures that exhibit a high level of invariance. 
There is little change or differentiation within this parameter 
throughout the work, which is formed almost exclusively from a 
single pitch class set, namely 3-3 using Forte's terminology. 
Through this form of cognitive saturation, listeners' attention is 
inevitably drawn to other parameters that are customarily 
subordinated or suppressed. This creates opportunities for 
instruments that are pitch-impoverished to contribute more 
equally to the musical argument. 
But other factors contribute to this process of pitch-demotion. 
The use of more or less densely articulated textures of sound, 
which are frequently opaque in quality, hinder the perception and 
definition of clearly delineated and precise pitch content. This is 
achieved by the use of either forward or backward temporal 
masking, whereby successive impulses mask or interfere with one 
another. This problematizes pitch definition. But with successful 
masking intervals being smaller than or equal to fifty 
milliseconds, we can only notate such effects indirectly and 
indeterminately, by superimposing different strata of mutually 
negating activity, the emergent complexity of which is a sum of 
that process of superimposition. This is how Stockhausen 
achieved some of the most effective, amorphous complexes 
in Gruppen , and it's a technique which contributes to the 
effectiveness of Gilbert Amy's use of two nearly identical 
ensembles in his Diaphonies : such effects are even more 
successful applied to identical timbre. In addition, forms 3: 
equivalent forms uses very few long durations, a form of 
articulation not generally available to percussion instruments. As 
the discriminability of the frequency of pitches is reduced the 
shorter in duration they are, this feature contributes to the 
successful mediation of pitch and noise. Psycho-acoustics offers 
us a wealth of analytical and generative tools with which to 
explore these new sonic phenomena. 
But as I outlined earlier, processes of parametric foregrounding 
cannot occur in isolation: one must consider how changes in one 
parameter propagate and affect others, or consider that in 
affecting change in one, others may need similar levels of 
processing. Thus pitch-demotion is itself a multi-
parametric operation. If this is not taken into account, one will 
achieve the kind of nonsense that often passes for radical action: 
notating key-slaps or various forms of ad hoc distortion for 
woodwind and brass in the hope that pitch and noise can be 
successfully mediated (assuming the composer in question even 
realises this is what they are trying to do) only emphasises even 
more their oppositional characters. You are right to query 
whether my concern for structural equivalence could be 
consistent with the demands for hierarchy that inhere in soloistic 
or concerto forms. Clearly they would not, and it is for this reason 
that I have not so far explored this area. But I have often 
contemplated how it might be done, and several methods await 
further elaboration. These include the use of multiple soloists 
employing multiple timbres, or, perhaps more effectively, 
multiple soloists employing singular timbre, such as five harp 
soloists with ensemble. In a sense, one has to find a way to 
project a one-to-many form within a many-to-many conceptual 
framework. I'll let you know how I get on. 
IP : How has the experience of writing for full orchestra in your 
new BBC commission forms 6: event aggregates worked out? 
How do you deal with the baggage that the medium itself carries 
with it? 
GD : All media comes to us with what you call 'baggage', or 
formulaic, reified, and routine methods of working. It should be 
part of any creative intellectual's creative programme to critique 
the medium in order to identify such features. If he or she does 
not, then one loses control and ownership of the medium. 
Composers of a neo-conservative tendency find this 'baggage', in 
all its manifestations and forms, very useful to them, as it 
enables them to control and manipulate listeners' responses, and 
to signify their own conformity which is a prerequisite for market 
success, which, from what I can see, is the primary measure they 
use in determining whether they have been creatively successful. 
The orchestral medium is no different in this respect, other than 
the scale of its resources offering more 'baggage', 'baggage' 
which can be displayed to a generally larger audience. 
One of my initial concerns whilst planning the work was the 
problem of scaling-up methods and techniques used in contexts 
that utilised significantly smaller resources. But in many ways, 
the process involved 'merely' projecting some of the features of 
forms 5: event intersection more radically and more diversely, in 
particular, determining and articulating multi-layered structures, 
activity and gesture. My emphasis on the point places significant 
constraints on the formation of higher-level sensory units or 
shapes that are super-ordinate to the single note. But if one 
wishes to exploit the opportunities offered by multi-levelled 
structures, then one has to discover ways of appropriately 
defining such levels of independence that nevertheless do not 
compromise this fundamental concern. It is this problem, 
amongst others, that has occupied much of my energies in forms 
6, and which offers some of the greatest potential for 
development for forms 7, which is to follow. 
But the experience of composing forms 6: event 
aggregates has confirmed my belief that, in principle, and with 
appropriate development and expansion, such forces are ideal for 
projecting the kind of ideas that form the basis of my creative 
programme. However, one meets significant resistance to 
developing the potential of orchestral resources, whether in terms 
of instrumental configuration, spatial distribution, or whatever, as 
the orchestra as customarily configured does not exist to serve 
the interests of composers of a genuinely enquiring disposition. 
Rather, it exists to perpetuate certain factions of power (at their 
most obvious, conductors, recording companies, and promoters) 
and as an adjunct to the corporate entertainment and leisure 
industries. This is a tragic waste of an extraordinarily rich and 
exciting resource. Somehow we have to claim it for ourselves. 
7. 
IP: Your visual art seems to employ similar strategies of hard-
edged abstraction to your music. Could you give me some idea of 
the means by which you settle upon proportion, figural placing, 
colour, etc., in your visual constructions, and the aesthetic ends 
you are striving for? 
GD : The pieces use industrial materials such as vinyl and plastic. 
And although I choose the materials and plan the works, they are 
realised by another party, usually sign-makers, who have at their 
disposal the kinds of materials that interest me, and the skills to 
manipulate and process them. There are many reasons why I use 
such materials. In the case of partitioned plane with line 
segments , for example, the level of precision obtainable from 
vinyl strips is far superior to paint. I would find painterliness a 
barrier to achieving the kinds of radical abstraction and 
construction that interests me. And such precision of means 
reflects and helps enable, the aesthetic-constructive ends. But my 
aesthetic-constructive aims are more fully realised in relief 
construction 1 . There is still a sense, in partitioned plane 
with line segments , that the object connotes something else. 
This is due to the illusion of depth that the superimposition of red 
segments over black lines creates: this isn't possible on a flat 
plane. Mondrian, of course, never did this (until his last works, 
which are a disappointment as a result), and if one seeks to 
maintain self-referentiality and fully pursue a non-
representational programme, then the constraints of the flat 
plane must be observed. In the case of relief construction 1 , 
the artwork is more fully the subject of our attention: the eye and 
the intellect halt at the object. relief construction 1 uses vinyl 
and plastic. Two, differently proportioned planes of black and 
white plastic are attached to a single, transparent orthogonal 
plane. Vertical strips of grey, yellow, and red vinyl are also 
applied, and the whole is then projected off the wall surface by a 
steel bracket positioned behind the larger black plastic plane. 
Opaque and transparent plastics such as these have very 
beautiful characteristics. They exhibit light and image reflective 
qualities that aid the object's integration, interaction, and 
discourse with the external environment. This desire to 
disintegrate the art work is a constant feature of constructive art, 
whether in the case of Gerrit Rietveld's Schroeder House and 
Berlin Chair, or Katarzyna Kobro's space compositions. It is an 
attempt to demote the individuality and particularity of the 
artwork, an environmental correlate of the underlying aesthetic 
aims of constructionism and pure plastic expression. 
The distribution of those elements that make up both of these 
works is obtained by the determination and superimposition of 
various number and coordinate systems, such as are obtainable 
from prime, exponential, and factorial sequences. But the works 
are not simply visual projections of mathematical ready-mades. 
Rather, as with my musical constructions, systematic and 
rigorous mathematical techniques function to both generate and 
to serve higher level aesthetic - or ideological - ends, to do with 
notions of structural balance and the distribution and density of 
incident. Perhaps the concept that most importantly links the 
visual and aural works is that of equivalence , which I discussed 
earlier with reference to forms 3: equivalent forms. If the 
positioning of elements in partitioned plane with line 
segments and relief construction 1 serves to privilege no area 
on the visual plane, then the organisation of forms 3: 
equivalent forms and other works in that series, functions in a 
similar way to confer equivalent status to each structural and 
material component. In both media, there is thus an attempt to 
construct non-centralised forms, in which contrasting elements of 
nevertheless equal strength negate and balance one another in a 
process of dynamic equilibrium. 
* * * * * * * 
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